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Abstract		How	does	a	person’s	leadership	or	membership	role	within	a	group	affect	how	others	judge	their	transgressions?	Participants	evaluated	either	a	leader	or	a	regular	member	of	either	an	ingroup	or	an	outgroup	who	transgressed	by	engaging	in	either	bribery	(Experiment	1)	or	blackmail	(Experiment	2).	In	both	experiments	transgressors	were	judged	less	punitively	if	they	were	ingroup	leaders	than	ingroup	members,	outgroup	members	or	outgroup	leaders.	The	severity	of	the	transgression	and	whether	it	served	group	interests	did	not	alter	this	effect,	which	shows	that	people	may	apply	a	double	standard	to	an	ingroup	leader’s	transgressions.	Implications	are	discussed	for	the	spread	of	corruption	among	leaders	and	followers.					Keywords:	Leadership,	Transgression,	Groups,	Corruption,	Deviance			 	
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"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are 
almost always bad men." Lord Acton, 1887 
Google	News	for	the	last	12	months	revealed	682000	hits	for	the	terms	scandal,	bribery,	blackmail,	corruption,	or	cheating,	of	which	7%	included	the	term	‘leader’.		Given	that	many	of	the	groups	are	large,	this	suggests	that	leaders	are	highly	likely	to	be	linked	in	some	way	with	transgression	in	their	groups.	Leader	scandals	arise	in	the	forms	of	corruption,	cheating	or	malpractice	in	business,	politics,	sport	and	other	arenas.		The	Watergate	scandal	springs	to	mind,	and	more	recently,	when	the	world’s	largest	selling	newspaper,	The	News	of	The	World,	engaged	in	telephone	hacking,	it	took	many	years	before	any	of	the	editors	or	senior	executives	were	forced	to	resign.			Examples	of	corrupt	leadership	also	exist	in	academic	psychology.		It	is	known	that	ingroup	members	who	behave	in	socially	undesirable	ways	are	generally	derogated	more	than	normative	members	or	normative	or	deviant	outgroup	members	(Marques	&	Paez,	1994),	a	so-called	‘black	sheep	effect’.		Indeed,	the	black	sheep	effect	is	stronger	the	more	established	the	deviant	is	within	the	group	(Pinto,	Marques,	Levine,	&	Abrams,	2010).	This	paper	contends	that	the	accentuation	of	differences	between	deviants	and	non-deviants	may	not	be	true	if	the	deviant	is	a	group	leader.	If	we	are	right	in	thinking	that	group	members	tend	to	allow	their	leaders	to	deviate	from	norms,	or	even	to	transgress	rules,	this	may	even	facilitate	a	perpetuation	and	widening	of	a	circle	of	corruption.	Given	the	pivotal	level	of	responsibility	held	by	group	leaders,	their	transgressions,	if	discovered,	have	the	potential	to	cause	havoc	and	devastation	for	the	group	(e.g.,	for	example,	the	closing	down	of	Britain’s	most	widely	read	news	paper,		The	News	of	the	World).	Therefore,	it	is	particularly	
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important	to	understand	whether	psychological	aspects	of	group	membership	create	a	space	for	corrupt	leadership.		Previous	research	indicates	that	people	may	treat	non-conformist	leaders	more	favorably	than	similar	non-leaders.	For	example,	leaders	who	are	trusted	can	deviate	more	from	group	norms	(e.g.	Fiske,	2010;	Hollander,	1958)	and	have	greater	influence	than	other	group	members	(e.g.	Pescosolido,	2001).	Recent	evidence	suggests	that	members	of	organizations	react	less	punitively	to	disappointing	leaders	if	those	leaders	have	provided	benefits	for	that	member	(Shapiro,	Boss,	Salas,	Targiarla,	&	von	Glinow,	2011).		There	are	still	interesting	and	novel	questions	to	pursue.	Of	central	importance	to	understanding	perceptions	of	corrupt	leadership	is	to	examine	people’s	responses	to	transgression.	Transgression	is		distinct	from	mere	opinion	deviance	or	disappointing	behavior.		Rather	than	simply	failing	to	adhere	to	a	social	norm	or	code	(which	people	are	free	to	do),	transgression	involves	manifestly	breaking	a	law	or	rule	that	applies	to	all	people	within	a	social	context.		In	principle,	all	transgressors	should	be	treated	equally	(punitively)	before	the	law.			Previous	research	has	examined	reactions	to	leaders	who	behave	in	undesirable	ways	(e.g.	Shapiro	et	al.,	2011)	but	it	has	not	tested	whether	people	will	react	differently	to	transgressions	by	leaders	as	compared	with	transgressions	by	members.		Although	theories	such	as	idiosyncrasy	credit	(Hollander,	1958)	suggest	that	transgressive	leaders	could	be	treated	more	leniently,	this	prediction	is	not	specified	by	the	theory.	Thus,	an	interesting	and	important	question	is	whether	a	transgressor	is	judged	differently	merely	
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because	he	or	she	occupies	the	leadership	role	rather	than	being	an	ordinary	group	member.	Furthermore,	in	the	present	research	we	consider	reactions	to	deviance	in	an	intergroup	context.	Social	identity	theory	holds	that	people	are	motivated	to	ensure	that	their	ingroups	are	distinct	from	and	better	than	outgroups.		Similarly,	image	theory	holds	that	ingroups	and	outgroups	are	evaluated	in	relative	terms	(e.g.,	Alexander,	Brewer,	&	Herrmann,	1999).	These	images	can	be	used	to	justify	outgroup	stereotypes.	For	example,	ingroups	may	tend	to	be	regarded	as	more	virtuous	and	justified	in	their	actions	than	outgroups,	which	may	be	demonized	(cf.	Alexander,	Brewer,	&	Livingston,	2005).	It	follows	that	people	would	also	be	motivated	to	ensure	that	their	leaders	are	clearly	different	from	and	better	than	outgroup	leaders,	because	leaders	are	usually	regarded	as	the	‘best’	or	most	representative	member	of	their	group	(Hogg,	2001).	Some	sociological	analyses	also	suggest	that	outgroup	leaders	might	be	more	demonized,	particularly	when	groups	are	in	conflict.	The	so-called	“evil-ruler	enemy	image”	suggests	that	groups	might	perceive	outgroup	leaders	as	corrupt	and	evil,	manipulating	the	ordinary	citizens	of	the	outgroup	(White,	1984).		However,	based	on	subjective	group	dynamics	theory	(Marques,	Paez,	&	Abrams,	2008)	we	contend	that	differential	judgments	of	individual	group	members	within	a	group	can	be	strongly	affected	by	the	intergroup	context	because	people	wish	to	reinforce	support	for	members	who	best	defend	the	value	of	their	ingroup.		When	ordinary	ingroup	members	deviate	from	social	norms	they	are	usually	derogated	more	than	outgroup	members	who	deviate	from	those	norms,	a	phenomenon	known	as	the	‘black	sheep	effect’	(Marques	&	Paez,	1994).	Recently,	Pinto	et	al.	(2010)	demonstrated	that	the	black	sheep	
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effect	applies	more	strongly	to	deviants	who	are	full	members	of	the	ingroup	than	to	those	who	are	marginal	members.	Social	identity	theory,	image	theory,	and	the	subjective	group	dynamics	theory	all	suggest	that		transgressions	by	ingroup	and	outgroup	members	may	be	judged	differently	and	that	leadership	conveys	a	special	status	within	the	group	that	may	also	affect	these	judgments..	Whereas	image	theory	and	social	identity	theory	might	imply	that	people	may	be	motivated	to	defend	the	ingroup	leader	as	an	icon	of	the	group’s	image,	perhaps	overlooking	deviance	or	transgression,	the	subjective	group	dynamics	model	suggests	that	ingroup	deviants	may	be	targets	of	particularly	negative	reactions.		Transgressions	are	much	more	extreme	than	opinion	deviance,	and	it	could	be	that	this	would	result	in	such	clearly	negative	judgments	of	a	transgressor	that	it	would	overwhelm	both	ingroup	bias	(indicated	by	social	identity	theory	and	image	theory)	and	differences	in	judgments	of	ingroup	and	outgroup	deviants.	In	this	case	transgressors	may	be	judged	by	the	same	consensual	standard	or	law	and	receive	similarly	negative	reactions	regardless	of	their	group	membership	or	their	member/leader	role	within	the	group.	However,	central	to	the	present	paper	is	our	contention	that	different	standards	may	be	applied	to	ingroup	leaders	in	intergroup	contexts,	such	that	their	transgressions	may	be	regarded	more	favorably/	less	punitively	than	transgressors	who	are	ordinary	members	or	outgroup	leaders.		This	prediction	has	a	precedent	in	prior	research	which	showed	that	leaders	who	express	deviant	opinions	are	sometimes	granted	‘innovation	credit’	–	greater	freedom	to	strike	out	in	a	new	direction,	as	compared	with	other	types	of	group	member	(Abrams,	Randsley	de	Moura,	Marques,	&	Hutchison,	2008;	
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Randsley	de	Moura,	Abrams,	Marques,	&	Hutchison,	2011).	The	present	paper	examines	whether	leaders	may	also	be	judged	more	favorably	even	when	they	behave	corruptly,	and	whether	reactions	to	transgressive	ingroup	leaders	are	different	from	reactions	to	transgressive	outgroup	leaders.		Transgressive	leaders	may	pose	a	dilemma	for	group	members	because	they	create	a	tension	between	members’	desire	to	uphold	consensual	standards	and	rules,	and	their	loyalty	to	the	group,	expressed	through	support	for	their	leader	(Lewis,	2011).	Leaders	are	putatively	ideal,	prototypical	representatives	of	the	group	(Hogg,	2001).	Loyalty	is	generally	a	strong	prescriptive	norm	to	which	group	members	are	expected	to	adhere,	and	particularly	so	in	intergroup	situations	(cf.	Abrams,	Rutland,	Ferrell,	&	Pelletier,	2008;	Zdaniuk	&	Levine,	2001).	Therefore,	we	contend	that	whereas	people	respond	critically	to	transgressions	committed	by	regular	ingroup	and	outgroup	members	and	by	outgroup	leaders,	they	will	be	less	critical	towards	a	transgressive	ingroup	leader,	thereby	applying	a	double	standard.		In	the	following	experiments	participants	judged	a	transgressor	who	was	either	a	leader	or	a	member	from	an	ingroup	or	an	outgroup.	Social	identity	theory,	and	image	theory,	would	hypothesize	that	ingroup	members	and	leaders	will,	on	average,	be	judged	more	favorably	than	outgroup	members	and	leaders	(a	main	effect	of	Group).	However,	different	theories	make	different	predictions	about	the	interaction	between	Group	and	Role.	Social	identity	and	image	theory	may	suggest	that	transgressive	ingroup	leaders	will	be	judged	most	favorably	and	transgressive	outgroup	leaders	least	favorably	–	due	to	the	“evil-ruler”	image.		Conversely,	the	subjective	group	dynamics	model	suggests	that,	if	possible,	ingroup	transgressors	would	be	judged	less	favorably	than	outgroup	
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transgressors,	and	possibly	that	this	effect	would	be	more	extreme	if	the	transgressors	are	leaders.	However,	based	on	previous	evidence	of	innovation	credit	for	ingroup	leaders	we	predict	the	operation	of	a	double	standard.	Specifically,	we	expect	that	an	ingroup	transgressive	leader	will	be	judged	less	critically	than	both	an	ingroup	transgressive	member	and	than	an	outgroup	transgressive	member	or	leader.	That	is,	we	predict	that	people	may	apply	one	rule	to	ingroup	leaders	and	another	for	everyone	else.	
Experiment	1	The	double	standard	hypothesis	was	assessed	by	presenting	a	scenario	that	involved	an ingroup university and an outgroup university in the South of 
England. A team from each university was negotiating bids with a governmental 
agency in a competitive application for substantial infrastructure funding for regional 
development. The scenario described activities of (the ingroup or outgroup) 
negotiating team. Either a regular member or leader learned that the committee chair 
was a fan of rare single malt whiskey, and covertly offered a bribe (in the form of 
whiskey) in the hope of influencing the decision.  
Participants (N = 41) were assigned randomly to condition and participated as 
part of course requirement. Participants were presented with the scenario and then 
completed dependent measures. A scale from 1 = not at all, 4 = somewhat, 7 = 
completely, was used to indicate the extent to which the person transgressed (i.e. 
broken the rules of the situation, either explicit or implicit). A scale from 1 = not at 
all to 5 = extremely was used to answer the questions,   “Regardless of how people 
behaved, how plausible is the overall situation described here?”, and “If this situation 
actually happened, how likely is it that this type of behavior could ever happen?”. 
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Three items then measured participants’ judgments of the transgressor. The 
question, “How negative or positive do you feel towards this person?” was answered 
using a slider from -50 to +50. The questions, “To what extent do you approve of 
what this person did?” and, “To what extent do you think the person should be 
punished for what they did?” were answered using scales from 1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much.  
Results	
Perception of Transgression	
The act was perceived as transgressive (M = 4.05, SD = 1.49) and the scenario 
was judged to be quite plausible and likely (Ms = 3.43, 3.57; SDs = 0.97, 0.97, 
respectively). There were no significant effects involving group or role.	
Judgments of Transgressor 	
The feeling, approval, and punitiveness ratings showed that participants felt 
negatively toward the transgressor (Ms = -2.44, 3.05, 2.66, SDs = 18.50, 1.17, 1.43, 
respectively). Punitiveness was reverse scored and then all three measures were 
standardized and averaged to form a composite scale (alpha = .75). A 2 x 2 between-
participants ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of role of the transgressor, F 
(1,37) = 0.38, p = .54, η2 = .010, but a significant effect of group, F (1, 37) = 8.61, p = 
.006, η2 = .189.  This was qualified by a significant group x role interaction, F (1,37) 
= 14.04, p < .001, η2 = .275, shown in Figure 1.	
The absence of a main effect of role suggests that there is no generally 
protective effect of being a group leader. Moreover, the pattern of the Group x Role 
interaction is not fully consistent either with the social identity/image theory 
predictions (that all ingroup transgressors would be judged more favorably than all 
outgroup transgressors) or those from subjective group dynamics theory (that ingroup 
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transgressors would be judged more negatively than outgroup transgressors, and a 
more extreme effect when the transgressors are leaders). Instead, consistent with the 
double standard hypothesis, a planned comparison between the ingroup leader (M  = 
.66, SD = 0.42) and all other conditions (M = -.17, SD  = 0.81) was significant, t (37) 
= 3.36, p = .002. Post hoc comparison indicated participants were significantly more 
favorable toward the ingroup leader than the outgroup leader (p < .001), and toward 
the ingroup leader than the ingroup member (p < .05). In addition, the outgroup leader 
was judged less favorably than the outgroup member, perhaps as participants seized 
the opportunity to condemn a central figure from the outgroup. 	
In sum, the scenario was plausible and likely, the bribery was viewed as 
transgressive, and, as hypothesized, a transgressive ingroup leader was evaluated 
more favorably than all other transgressors. These findings are consistent with the 
idea that people apply a double standard when evaluating transgressive ingroup 
leaders.	
Experiment	2	
In Experiment 1 it was possible that the double standard was applied to the 
ingroup leader because the transgression was not seen to be very serious. Moreover, 
perhaps the polarized evaluations of the ingroup and outgroup leader reflected that the 
transgressions also directly served the interests of their respective groups. Perhaps it is 
only when a transgression is obviously very serious or when there is no group interest 
at stake that people will treat their own leaders as they would other transgressors. 
Moreover, it is possible that people show leniency towards their leaders because they 
think the leader is genuinely acting in the interests of the group.  
In Experiment 2 we tested these ideas using a scenario in which the 
competitive situation involved ingroup and outgroup countries. There are myriad 
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examples of allegedly corrupt international practices involving forms of blackmail or 
pressure to secure deals (e.g. the arrest of Tsvetelin Kanchev, leader of the Bulgarian 
Euroroma party, who was arrested in 2010, charged with blackmail). The scenario 
was intended to capture some of the flavor of these while also using a different 
context; one that did not involve a direct conflict of interests between the groups, and 
that involved a more serious transgression than that used in Experiment 1. 
Specifically, we focused on the clearly criminal transgression of blackmail. 
Participants were asked to evaluate an ingroup or outgroup, non-leader or leader, who 
attempted to blackmail a committee chair. According to our hypothesis a 
transgressive ingroup leader should be evaluated more favorably than transgressors 
that are either ingroup non-leaders or that are outgroup leaders or non-leaders.  
To ensure that our scenario did not involve a conflict of interest between the 
groups we conducted pilot work to develop materials for this study. To establish a 
baseline we tested how leaders and group members would be regarded in various 
contexts. Relating to the context used for Experiment 2, participants judged ingroup 
or outgroup leader and member targets in a situation in which the goal was described 
as being to decide which charities should received money. As expected we did not 
find any effects of target group or of role, or an interaction. Participants judged all of 
the targets favorably (approval M = 5.06, punishment M = 2.35, feeling M = 21.43) 
and as not having transgressed (M = 2.61). Targets were judged to be moderately 
group serving (M = 3.85). This scenario was used for Experiment 2 because the 
baseline data indicated that there would be no reason to expect a-priori preferences for 
leaders or for an ingroup, in this type of context. 
Participants (N = 35) were assigned randomly to condition in a 2 (Group: 
ingroup, outgroup) x 2 (Role: leader, non-leader) between-participants design and 
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participated as part of course requirement. Participants read a scenario in which 
charities from Britain (ingroup) and Germany (outgroup) were trying to influence an 
international committee’s decision in favor of their different priorities for allocation 
of emergency relief funds. The committee was evenly divided in its preferences. A 
member (non-leader) or the nominated Advocate (leader) of either the ingroup or 
outgroup committee discovered a highly embarrassing photo that could be used to 
blackmail the committee chair and covertly used it to try to influence the chair’s 
casting vote.  
Participants then completed the dependent measures that were previously used 
in Experiment 1 to measure judgments of the transgressor. In addition, to determine 
whether the double standard is attributable to group protection motives, participants 
rated the motivation of the transgressor to serve the group as a whole (1=definitely 
not, 5=definitely).  
Results	
Perception	of	Transgression	
The scenario was rated as plausible and likely (Ms  = 3.37, 3.60; SDs = 0.73, 
0.85, respectively). As expected, the act was perceived as highly transgressive (M = 
5.47, SD = 1.42). A comparison with the transgression	rating	from	Experiment	1	confirmed	that	the	transgression	in	Experiment	2	was	perceived	as	significantly	more	serious,	t (72) = 4.25, p < .001. Also, as expected, there were no significant 
effects involving group or role on the perceived seriousness of the transgression.	
Judgments of Transgressor 	
The favorability, approval, and punitiveness ratings all showed derogation of 
the transgressor (Ms = -25.97, 1.89, 4.03, SDs = 15.91, 1.13, 1.40). The standardized 
scale  (alpha = .73) was analyzed using a 2 (Group) x 2 (Role)  between-participants 
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ANOVA. This revealed no significant main effects of either the group membership or 
role of the transgressor, Fs < 1.52, ps > .22, η2 s <.05.  There was a significant Group 
x Role interaction, F (1,31) = 4.61, p = .04, η2 = .13, shown in Figure 2. 	
In line with the double standard hypothesis, the planned comparison between 
the ingroup leader (M = .60, SD  = .97) and all other conditions (M = -.17, SD  = .67) 
was significant, t (31) = 2.47, p = .019.  Post hoc comparisons showed that 
participants were significantly more favorable towards the ingroup leader than the 
outgroup leader (p < .05), and more favorable to the ingroup leader than the non-
leader (p < .05). 	
Transgressor Motivation 
The transgressor was viewed as moderately group serving (M = 3.20, SD = 
1.45). However, this perception was not affected by Role, Group or their interaction 
(Fs < 0.80, ps > .37, η2 s <  .026), and the Group x Role interaction on judgments of 
the transgressor remained significant even when motivation was treated as a 
covariate, F (1,30) = 4.14, p = .044, η2 = .128. This covariance analysis demonstrates 
that the extent to which the actor is perceived as acting on behalf of the group makes 
no difference to our effects. In addition, the lack of main effects or an interaction on 
motivation means it cannot mediate effects on other variables.	
In sum, regardless of which group or actor transgressed, the action was viewed 
as transgressive and also as plausible, likely, and moderately group serving. In 
Experiment 2 the judgments of the transgressor were not consistent with social 
identity and image theory or with subjective group dynamics theory because there 
was no overall difference in lenience toward ingroup transgressors and no sign that 
leaders received more extreme judgments then members per se. Nor do the findings 
suggest a special status for leaders per se (cf Hollander, 1958). Instead the findings 
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support the specific pattern predicted by the double standard hypothesis.  As in 
Experiment 1, though involving a significantly more serious transgression, 
transgressive ingroup leaders were judged less punitively than all other types of 
transgressor. 	
Discussion	
The findings show that leaders who break rules may more likely than others to 
evade punishment. Specifically, transgressors who lead the ingroup are judged less 
punitively than others who commit the same transgression but who are ingroup 
members, outgroup members or outgroup leaders. Experiment 1 demonstrated the 
double standard for judgments of people who corruptly engaged in covert bribery. 
Experiment 2 employed a much more serious transgression and investigated a 
potential mediator. The double standard persisted in this severe and criminal 
transgression (blackmail). Moreover, the extent to which participants believed that the 
transgressor was motivated to act on behalf of the group did not affect their judgments 
of the transgressor. This finding, although a null effect, is pertinent to the possibility 
drawn from Hollander’s (1958) idiosyncrasy credit theory, that people tolerate leaders 
who diverge from group norms because they believe that the leaders have somehow 
earned the right because of their prior commitment and dedication to the group. 
Although Hollander’s insight remains plausible in general, there is nothing in the 
theory that distinguishes reactions to ingroup and outgroup leaders, and it does not 
appear to help to explain the present findings. This may be because transgressions, 
rather than merely being freely chosen expressions of divergence from a group norm, 
reflect breaches of consensually accepted rules. 	
This evidence is consistent with the idea that people are uniquely reluctant to  
express punitive reactions to ingroup leaders, and is consistent with evidence that 
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people are cautious about blowing the whistle on leaders’ transgressions (cf Near & 
Miceli, 2011). Even though group members may sometimes engage in constructive 
dissent (Packer, 2009), their ingroup loyalty may mean that they baulk at derogating a 
transgressive leader (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). Although the findings are not 
consistent with the black sheep effect, they are consistent with the idea that people 
may be concerned with the implications of their judgments for the way other group 
members will view them. For example, the black sheep effect is moderated by the 
presence of an ingroup audience (Marques et al., 1998), and people are aware that 
disloyalty may attract negative reactions from fellow group members (Abrams, 
Rutland, et al., 2008). Given the pivotal significance of ingroup leaders, particularly 
in public situations, it may be that people find it difficult to judge their leader harshly 
without feeling that they have behaved disloyally. This in turn may undermine their 
identification with their group.  	
It is important to note that this research highlights that transgressors do not all 
equally benefit (or suffer) from  judgments based on ingroup bias. Simple ingroup 
loyalty and bias, or the desire to support a more favorable image of the ingroup than 
the outgroup, could be expected to result in significant ingroup vs outgroup 
differences in judgments of transgressors both when the transgressors were leaders 
and when they were ordinary members. .However, we did not find that ingroup 
members were judged favorably. Thus, the judgments do highlight that people may be 
motivated to protect their own leader, resulting in a double standard. This is consistent 
with the idea that the potential psychological costs of accepting that one’s leader is 
flawed might mean that people afford greater leniency towards their ingroup leaders 
than to others. 
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The present findings do not appear to  reflect a presumption of innocence or 
greater trust in leaders per se because there was no significant main effect of Role on 
judgments of the transgressors in either experiment. Importantly, judgments of the 
transgressors were not affected by perceptions of the extent to which the 
transgressor’s motivation was perceived to be group-serving, which tends to rule out 
an explanation in terms of idiosyncrasy credit. Moreover, we find no support for the 
possibility that judgments are driven by a perception of potential for group gain or 
profit because the double standard was applied both when the ingroup stood to gain 
(Experiment 1) and when it did not (Experiment 2).  Interestingly, the double standard 
does not seem to be based on changed perceptions of the transgression itself -- the 
perceived seriousness of the transgression was not affected by the role of the 
transgressor in either experiment. Thus, we conclude that the double standard effect is 
most likely attributable to people’s motivation to be loyal to their group, which is 
signaled by evaluations of their group leader. According to Abrams et al. (2008) 
ingroup leaders attract loyalty both because they are assumed to be prototypical for 
their group, a process of ‘accrual’ through group socialization (cf. Hogg, 2001; 
Levine & Moreland, 2004), and because their occupancy of the leadership role 
entitles them to redefine the group prototype, thereby creating the scope to lead the 
group in new directions (a process of ‘conferral’). Although there is good evidence 
for these processes in the case of innovation credit, this interpretation of the 
application of a double standard needs to be tested by further research. 
The present findings raise several new questions for future research. One 
question is how perceptions of leaders and group members might change over time. 
Previous evidence shows that deviants may be treated differently if they are 
newcomers rather than established group members (Pinto et al., 2010), and that 
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deviant leaders may be judged more favorably if they are new rather than ex leaders 
(Abrams et al., 2008). Therefore, it seems plausible that the double standard may be 
applied less to ex leaders and perhaps more to incoming leaders. Relatedly, it would 
be interesting to test whether transitions from non-transgression to transgression, or 
vice versa (i.e. becoming more or less virtuous), provokes different responses 
depending on whether the target is a leaders or a member. For example, it could be 
that ingroup leaders are more readily forgiven their transgressions if they have a 
previously unblemished record, or if they subsequently compensate by behaving 
impeccably. The same might not be true when people judge members or outgroup 
leaders.  
Transgression can be considered to be a very extreme form of deviance from 
social rules that should invite unambiguous disapproval. Consistent with that 
expectation we did not find a black sheep effect in responses to deviant group 
members (which would imply greater derogation of the ingroup transgressor than the 
outgroup transgressor). Yet it is all the more remarkable that responses to 
transgressive leaders showed the opposite pattern quite strikingly. This suggests that 
ingroup loyalty may result in different types of response to non-normative group 
members depending on both the extent of the deviance and the role of the deviant. 
When a member expresses opinion deviance other members may protect the ingroup 
norm by derogating the deviant. However, in the cases of either transgression or 
innovation, it seems that loyalty also presses people to defer when the deviant is their 
leader. This can reduce (Abrams et al., 2008) or even reverse (the present studies) the 
usual black sheep effect. These findings are consistent with the idea that people 
sometimes confer upon their leaders the right to define the group prototype, which 
makes it difficult to challenge, derogate or condemn leaders who deviate. 
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The findings also suggest avenues for future research. Based on pilot work and 
the need to construct plausible and meaningful intergroup contexts, we used scenarios 
that matched examples of real world transgressions. Anecdotally, such transgressions 
typically arise when groups are in contexts facing uncertain outcomes. It may be that 
people are also more likely to apply a double standard when there are increased levels 
of uncertainty (Hogg, 2000) or intergroup competition (Sherif, 1966), and there may 
be important cultural differences in willingness to tolerate transgression (Mazar & 
Aggarwal, 2011).  There may also be important audience effects and self- and group-
regulation processes that moderate the effect (cf. Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & 
Ferrell, 2007; Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 2008). The scenarios 
seemed meaningful to participants, and are a useful tool to manipulate the same 
behavior whilst varying group and role of the trangressor. Nonetheless, it would be 
useful to further the investigation of transgressive leadership using more minimal 
group paradigms, face-to-face groups, archival research, or simulated virtual reality. 	
These findings have implications for the way organizations, cultures, and 
society deal with illegal, dishonest and corrupt behavior by their leaders. We showed 
that the double standard arises both when transgression is moderate and when it is 
clearly criminal. If this phenomenon persists even when the transgression is heinous it 
constitutes a serious problem for groups and societies capacity to regulate themselves. 
This double standard may be implicated in explanations for why groups are 
sometimes complicit in their leaders’ perpetrations of serious malpractice or 
recklessness (e.g. leaders of major banks leading up to the 2008 financial crisis), or 
even extreme acts of military atrocities, terrorism or genocide. Moreover, it is not just 
a case that ‘power corrupts’. It also may be that members allow or tolerate corruption 
among leading ingroup members at the same time as apparently upholding higher 
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standards when judging similarly transgressive others. Thus, we may conclude that, 
rather than power being inherently corrupting, people may be prone to collude 
implicitly in the corruption of leaders by failing to condemn or regulate their 
transgressions. 
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Figure	1.	Experiment	1:	Favorability	towards	a	transgressor	(briber)	as	a	function	of	their	group	membership	and	role	in	the	group.						
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Figure	2.	Experiment	2:	Favorability	towards	a	transgressor	(blackmailer)	as	a	function	of	their	group	membership	and	role	in	the	group.						
				 	
